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Thus, an implied agreement should be alleged in any suit factually similar
to Cooper, Mrs. Cooper was presumably aware of Dr. Cooper's suit involving
the real estate at issue; she affirmatively acknowledged this fact by cosigning
a termination of management contract with her husband and Texas Gulf Industries. 60 That termination was a part of the relief sought by Mr. Cooper
in the first suit. Therefore, an agreement allowing Dr. Cooper to litigate the
suit involving the joint management community property could be implied
by her conduct. Both spouses consequently would be bound by the dismissal
in the first action.
The Cooper decision should also be viewed in light of the additional costly
litigation which the courts and Texas Gulf Industries will incur in a second.
suit on the same issue. As a result of Cooper both spouses should, in the
future, be joined in any action involving their joint management community
property in order to avoid such multiple litigation.
Since it must be presumed that the court intended to abide by the constitutional provisions regarding the proper method of partitioning community
property during marriage, there should be little difficutly in determining the
proper result of this suit on remand. Ultimately -the Texas Supreme Court
has succeeded in following the legislature's mandate requiring equality of the
spouses regarding power to manage joint management community property.
As a result of Cooper there is no doubt that both spouses are now equal in
this regard. The court has concluded what the reform movements and legislature intended-the abolition of the husband's sole right to manage the joint
management community property.
J. Brian Sokolik

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE-ACCOMMODATION PARTY
-The Sole Maker Of A Promissory Note Is An Accommodation
Party For Payee When Notes Executed For Sole Purpose
Of Allowing Payee To Obtain Credit
Darden v. Harrison,511 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. 1974).
Plaintiff Peggy Harrison, sole devisee and surviving widow of Frank Tirey,
brought suit on two promissory notes executed by defendant, D. M. Darden,
in favor of Tirey. Tirey was the holder and payee on the notes.
60. Cooper v. Texas Gulf Indus., Inc., 495 S.W.2d 273, 274 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1973), rev'd, 513 S.W.2d 200 (Tex. 1974).
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Tirey had asked Darden to execute the notes so that Tirey could list them
on a financial statement in order to procure a loan which was to be used

for -the purpose of settling accounts between the parties. The understanding
between Darden and Tirey was that the notes would not represent any obligation between them. The notes were never negotiated, nor was there any

evidence that the notes were ever listed on a financial statement or that a
loan was actually received.
Darden's defenses were that there was no consideration for his execution
of the -notes, and that he was an accommodation party for Tirey's benefit
and was therefore not liable to the party accommodated. Judgment was
rendered for the plaintiff, and 'the court of civil appeals affirmed. 1 HeldReversed. The test for determining the existence of accommodation
status is not whether the alleged accommodation party received no considera-

tion for his signature, but is whether the alleged party accommodated
2
received the signature of the surety for the sole purpose of obtaining credit.

The concept of the accommodation party stems from the generic concept
of suretyship, an ancient institution dating from biblical times.3 Suretyship
has been defined in various ways;4 one workable definition is that the surety
is a person who assumes responsibility for the performance of some act by
another. 5 This responsibility is contractual in nature, 6 involving a tripartite
7
agreement among creditor, debtor and surety.
1. Darden v. Harrison, 495 S.W.2d 49, 52 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1973), rev'd,
511 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. 1974).
2. Darden v. Harrison, 511 S.W.2d 925, 928 (Tex. 1974).
3. Clark, Suretyship In The Uniform Commercial Code, 46 TEXAS L. REV. 453
(1968); see Loyd, The Surety, 66 U. PA. L. Rev. 40 (1917).
The aspects of suretyship which have been incorporated into commercial law took
form in the law merchant, from which the common law was developed. Farnsworth,
A General Survey of Article 3 And An Examination Of Two Aspects of Codification,
44 TEXAS L. REV. 645 (1966).
4. RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY § 82 (1941) defines suretyship:
Suretyship is the relation which exists where one person has undertaken an obligation and another person is also under an obligation or other duty to the obligee,
who is entitled to but one performance, and as between the two Who are bound,
one rather than the other should perform.
TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 34.01 (1967) offers a different definition:
" '[S'urety' includes endorser, guarantor, drawer of drafts which have been accepted, and
every other form of suretyship .... ." See Clark, Suretyship In The Uniform Commercial Code, 46 TEXAS L. REV. 453, 454 (1968).
5. Madison County Farmers Ass'n v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 209 F.2d 581,
585-86 (8th Cir. 1954); Magill v. Brown, 50 S.W. 642 (Tex. Civ. App. 1899, writ denied); see Peters, Suretyship Under Article 3 Of The Uniform Commercial Code, 77
YALE L.J. 833, 836 (1968).
6. United States v. Price, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 83, 91 (1850); Durham v. McDowell,
265 S.W. 425, 426 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1924, no writ).
7. E.g., Stabs v. City of Tower, 40 N.W.2d 362, 370 (Minn. 1949); Tolbert v.
Standard Accident Ins. Co., 148 Tex. 235, 241, 223 S.W.2d 617, 620 (1949); Clark,
Suretyship In The Uniform Commercial Code, 46 TEXAS L. REV. 453, 454 (1968); J.
WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 13-12, at 426 (1972).
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The more restricted concept of accommodation party is derived from the
general concept of surety. An accommodation party is, therefore, generally
described as a surety of negotiable paper. 8 The law of negotiable paper is
embodied in the Uniform Commerical Code ,(UCC), which has been enacted
in all of the states, except Louisiana.0 Article 3 of the Code has not adopted
the language of suretyship, but speaks rather of an accommodation party,
who acts as a surety for the party accommodated, the principal debtor.' 0
The relationship between the surety and the accommodation party is shown
only in the official comments to the Code."
Under the Code, the accommodation party can sign the instrument in any
capacity.' 2 The distinction between him and an ordinary signator of negotiable paper is that he signs for the purpose of lending the benefit of his name
to. another party to the instrument." If the instrument is acquired subsequent to its execution by a taker who has given value for the instrument
before it was due, the accommodation party is liable to the taker -in the
capacity in which he has signed.' 4 If -the accommodation party signs as a
maker -of a- note, he is primarily liable to the taker or holder, 15 and
secondarily liable if 'he has signed in .the capacity of indorser. 16
Accommodation status is a desirable position in certain circumstances
because of the various defenses and rights attached to it. The accommoda8. The .courts and legal writers have treated the proposition that an accommodation
party is'a surety as axiomatic. See Rose v. Homsey, 197,N.E.2d 603, 606 (Mass. 1964);

First Nat'l Bank v. Hargrove, 503 S.W.2d 856, 859 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1973,
no writ); First State Bankv. Hare, 152 S.W. 501, 502 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1912,
no writ); Putney Credit Union v. King, 286 A.2d 282, 284 (Vt. 1971); UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-415, Comments; Clark, Suretyship In The Uniform Commercial
Code, 46 TEXAS L. REV. 453, 455 (1968); Murray, Accommodation Parties: A Potpourri of Problems, 22 U. MIAMI L. REV. 814 (1968).
9. J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1, at 4 (1972).
10. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-415. "Surety" and "Accommodation Party"
are us'ed interchangeably by the authorities. J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF

13-12, at 426 n.1 (1972); Peters, Suretyship Under Article 3 Of The Uniform Commercial Code, 77 YALE L.J. 833,
837 (1968).
11. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 3-415, 3-606, Comments; see Clark, Suretyship In The Uniform Commercial Code, 46 TEXAS L. REV. 453 (1968).
12. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-415(1). This section states: "An accomTHE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §

modation party is one who signs the instrument in any capacity for the purpose of lending his name to another party to it."
13. Id.

14. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-415(2); Wheeless. v. Eudora Bank, 509 S.W..

2d 532, 535 (Ark. 1974); Seaboard Fin. Co., v. Dorman, 227 A.2d 441,442 (Conn. Cir.
Ct* 1966).

15. Jamaica Tobacco & Sales Corp, v. Ortner, 333 N.Y.S. 2d 669, 677 .(Cir. Ct.

1972); Musey v. Dickinson Social Club, 466 S.W.2d 84, 87 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston

[1st Dist.] 1971, no writ); Trabue v. Cook, 124 S.W. 455, 457 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910i
no writ).
16.' Artistic Greetings, Inc.. v. Sholom Greeting Card Co., 318 N.Y.S.2d 623, 625
(Sup. Ct. 1971).
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tion party is never liable to' the party who has been accommodated," 7 and
he has the benefit of certain discharges if the party accommodated and the
creditor alter the nature of the obligation without the consent of the accommodation party.' 8
.Prior to the enactment of the UCC a party claiming accommodation status
had to show that he had signed "without receiving value therefore" for the
purpose of lending the benefit of his name to some other person. 19 The
receipt of consideration directly by the party claiming accommodation status
was fatal to the claim. 20

The Code does not retain these requirements, and

cases which have dealt with the question have held that the receipt of con21
sideration directly by the accommodation party is no longer controlling.
The most frequent means by which 'accommodation is accomplished is by
the party signing as a maker. 22 In this connection special problems arise
.17.. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-415(5); Fairfield County Trust Co. v. Steinbrecher, 255 A.2d 144, 149 (Conn. Cir. Ct. 1968); Amodeo v. Allen, 54 A.2d 363 (N.H.
1947) (not. liable at common law or under Negotiable Instruments Law); Northern
Plumbing Supply, Inc. v. Gates, 196 N.W.2d 70, 72 (N.D. 1972); King v. Wise, 282
S.W. 570, 572 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1926, jdgmt adopted). The right of recourse an accommodation party has against the party accommodated explains why this is the case.
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-415, Comment 4. Even if the party accommodated
reacquires the instrument from a holder in due course, he cannot recover from the accommodation party. Ward v. Vaughn, 298 S.W.2d 862, 865-66 (Tex. Civ. App.Galveston 1957, no writ).
18. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-606. For a discussion of these discharges,
see Clark, Suretyship In The Uniform Commercial Code, 46 TEXAs L. REv. 453, 457
(1968).
19. Tex. Laws 1919, ch. 123, § 29, at 194, reads:
An accommodation party is one who has signed the instrument as maker, drawer,acceptor, or indorser, without receiving value therefor, and for, the purpose of lending his name to some other person. Such a person is liable on the instrument to
a holder for value, notwithstanding such holder at the time of taking the instrument
knew him to be only an accommodation party.
Like any:contract, the contract of accommodation must be supported by consideration,
but the consideration moving to the party accommodated is deemed sufficient to support
the promise of the accommodation party. Gilbreath v. Cage & Crow, 198 S.W. .972
(Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1917, no writ); Central Bank & Trust Co. v. Ford, 152 S.W.
700, 703-704 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1912, writ ref'd). -This requirement is more
meaningful in light of the fact that the traditional purpose of the accommodation party
is to lend his name to another party, not to receive any direct benefit himself: The connotation of the word "accommodation" is an act performed gratuitously. William D.
Seymour & Co. v. Castell, 107 So. 143, 145 (La. 1926); Robertson v. City Nat'l Bank,
36 S.W.2d 481, 483 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1931, opinion adopted); Vitkovitch v. Kleinecke, 75 S.W. 544, 546 (Tex. Civ. App. 1903, no writ) (pre-N.I.L.).
20. Sutton v. Schoellkopf,- 62 S.W.2d 318, 321 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1933, writ
ref'd).
21. Franklin Nat'l Bank v. Eurez Constr. Corp., 301 N.Y.S.2d 845, 848 (Sup. Ct.
1969); Jeffrey v. Bond, 498 S.W.2d 31, 34 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1973), rev'd on
other grounds, 509 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. 1974). The comments to the Code indicate that
the drafters' intentionally excluded this requirement, and the cases have followed their
direction. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE. § 3-415, Comment 2; see Note, Suretyship In
Article 3 Of The Uniform Commercial Code, 17 W. REs. L. REv. 318, 328 (1965).
22. United Refrigerator Co. v. Applebaum, 189 A.2d 253, 255 (Pa. 1963); Clark,
Suretyship In The Uniform Commercial Code, 46 TEXAS L. REv. 453, 455 (1968). To
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when the payee on an instrument is alleged to be the party accommodated.
The relationship of the parties as shown on the face of the instrument evidences prima facie liability of the maker or indorser, according to the
capacity in which his signature is given. 23 Therefore, pre-Code law placed
an additional burden of proof on a party alleging that the payee was the
party accommodated. This additional element of proof was first announced
in Brinker v. First National Bank,24 where it was held that the payee can
also be the party accommodated only -if
the instrument was executed "for
the sole purpose of negotiationby the payee in order to obtain credit thereby"
and where the payee 'has agreed to indemnify the maker. 25 The payee could
not 'be the party accommodated even if the maker had received no consideration for his signature, and the payee was in some way benefited or
accommodated. 26 Although it was not explained in the opinion, -the reason
for this is that the question of who was actually accommodated is critical
where it is the payee who is claimed to be the party accommodated. 27 The
effect of Brinker was to make the intent of the maker the determinative factor in finding the payee to be the party accommodated. If the purpose of
the maker was negotiation of the instrument by the payee, only then would
the payee be accommodated by the maker. 28
There is authority, however, which is in conflict with the "sole purpose
of negotiation" test announced in Brinker. In Central National Bank v.
illustrate, A signs as a co-maker with B on a promissory note, so that C, the payee on

the instrument, will accept it in return for extending credit or a loan to B. A is an
accommodation party for B, and has the primary liability of a maker, the capacity in
which he has signed, in the event B does not petform according to the tenor of the note.
See, for example, Deems v. Wilson, 151 S.E.2d 230 (Ga. Ct. App. 1966) (a mother
signed a promissory note along with her minor son so that he could purchase a car).

23.

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

§ 3-415(2); Schreiber v. Jones, 278 S.W.2d 902,

904 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1955, no writ).
24. 16 S.W.2d 965 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1929), rev'd on other grounds, 37 S.W.
2d 136 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1931, jdgmt adopted).
25. Id. at 967 (emphasis added).
26. Id. at 967.
27. It was determined that the party accommodated was actually a co-maker of
Brinker's, and not the payee bank. This finding is common where there is an allegation
that the payee is a party accommodated. It is either a party not on the instrument that
is accommodated, or one signing as a co-maker or indorser, and not the payee. See,
e.g., Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. Superior Court, 84 Cal. Rptr. 421
(Ct. App. 1970); Deems v. Wilson, 151 S.E.2d 230 (Ga. Ct. App. 1966); McIntosh v.
White, 447 S.W.2d 75, 78 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969).
28. Brinker v. First Nat'l Bank, 16 S.W.2d 965, 967 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1929),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 37 S.W.2d 136 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1931, jdgmt adopted).
In at least two cases, each involving an indorser, the intent of the signator was that the
payee negotiate the instrument, although this was never done. United Refrigerator Co.
v. Applebaum, 189 A.2d 253, 254 (Pa. 1963) (Code decision); McKeever v. BrooksDavis Chevrolet Co., 74 S.W.2d 311, 312 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1934, writ dism'd).
In both cases, accommodation status was successfully invoked. Thus, it appears intent
is the controlling factor.
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947

Lawson29 and in Whitesboro National Bank v. Wells 30 accommodation party

status was successfully invoked by a maker where there was no negotiation

of -the note by the payee, nor was negotiation of the note contemplated by
2
-themaker. 3 1 Neither case referred to the Brinker decision.1
In Darden v. Harrison,33 the maker of two promissory notes was held to
be an accommodation party for the plaintiff's decedent, the payee.3 4 No
evidence was introduced that the notes had been listed as collateral by the
payee in order to procure a loan, although this was what the parties had
contemplated when the notes were executed. The notes were not negotiated.
Darden's allegation that he had received no consideration for signing was
rejected by the district and civil appeals courts as not supported by the evidence. 35 Relying on the official comments for guidance, the supreme court
decided that it is now immaterial whether consideration was received by a
party claiming accommodation status.3 "The essential characteristic is that
the accommodation party is a surety, and not that he has signed gratuitously."' 37 Clearly it was the intention of the drafters of the Code to dispense
with the element of consideration as a determinative factor in finding accommodation status,38 and -the courts have followed the intent of the drafters
3 9
whenever the question has been presented.
29. 27 S.W.2d 125 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1930, jdgmt adopted).
30. 143 Tex. 232, 184 S.W.2d 276 (1944).
31. Whitesboro Nat'l Bank v. Wells, 143 Tex. 232, 235, 184 S.W.2d 276, 277
(1944); Central Nat'l Bank v. Lawson, 27 S.W.2d 125, 127 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1930,
jdgmt adopted). In both of these cases banks secured promissory notes for the purpose
of showing sufficient assets when a bank examiner was due to make an inspection.
32. This problem has not been uniformly treated in other jurisdictions. In one Missouri case prior to the enactment of the Code, Morrison V. Painter, 170 S.W.2d 965,
971 (Mo. Ct. App. 1943) and one under the Code, McIntosh v. White, 447 S.W.2d 75,
78 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969) the maker was not allowed to assert accommodation status
against the payee where there was no intent by the maker that the payee negotiate the
instrument. The California decisions all involve facts similar to Whitesboro, and adopt
the same line of reasoning. First Nat'l Bank v. Reed, 244 P. 368, 370 (Cal. 1926);
Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Superior Court, 84 Cal. Rptr. 421, 423
(Ct. App. 1970) (Code decision); Lepori v. Hilson, 293 P. 86, 88 (Cal. Ct. App. 1930).
The Georgia court, in a decision under the Code, where there had been no negotiation
of the note, the maker's intent was given great weight, although it was shown that the
party accommodated was actually a co-maker and not the payee, as the maker contended.
Deems v. Wilson, 151 S.E.2d 230, 231 (Ga. Ct. App. 1966).
33. 495 S.W.2d 49 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1973), rev'd, 511 S.W.2d 925 (Tex.
1974).
34. Darden v. Harrison, 511 S.W.2d 925, 928 (Tex. 1974).
35. Id. at 926.
36. Id. at 925.
37. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE § 3.415, Comment 2 (1968).
38. TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE § 3.415, Comment 2 (1968) reads in part:
[Slubsection (a) elminates the language of the old Section 29 [of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law] requiring that the accommodation party sign the instrument 'without receiving value therefor.'
39. In Jeffrey v. Bond, 498 S.W.2d 31, 34 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1973), rev'd
on other grounds, 509 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. 1974), the receipt by the accommodation maker
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The court also gave attention to Harrison's allegation that the payee may
be a party accommodated only when the instrument has been. negotiated;
disavowing any language in Brinker which would have required actual
negotiation of the instrument by the payee. 40 The interpretation given
Brinker by the plaintiff is particularly dubious, since the test in that case
was whether "the sole purpose [was] of negotiation," rather than whether
the instrument in question had been negotiated. 41 Citing Whitesboro and
Lawson the court stated that "[t]he essential element that the party claiming
accommodation status must prove is that the party claimed .to be accommodated received the signature of the surety for the sole purpose of obtaining
credit thereby ..... "42 Thus, the "sole purpose of negotiation' test
promulgated by the Brinker.decision was expanded to a test of "sole purpose
of obtaining credit thereby." It was reasoned that while negotiation is the
usual route a payee will take in order to obtain credit, the act of negotiation
is not controlling on the question of whether or not there was an accommodation of the payee. 43 It is not made clear in Darden whether the credit must
be obtained, but it seems to be a fair inference that it need not. Tirey did
not utilize the notes in any way; yet Darden was found to be an accommodation party. Therefore, the maker's intent alone was held to be sufficient.
The court has attempted to reconcile the two lines of reasoning represented
by Whitesboro and Brinker. While negotiation is the most direct means of
allowing the payee to obtain credit, the use of negotiable instruments to show
solvency is an equally useful means of lending credit. Limiting -the finding
of accommodation status only to situations where negotiation is contemplated
is, therefore, too narrow.
If the court in Darden intends, as it appears to, that a third party need
not extend credit.to the payee for him to be a party accommodated, a difficult
question is raised-though not addressed-by plaintiff's allegation 'that an
accommodation party must be a :surety. 44 The evidence failed to show that
the fundamental tripartite structure of suretyship. came into existence. As
of some benefit for his signature did not preclude the finding of accommodation status.
In another jurisdiction where the defense of no consideration has been asserted, it has
been held insufficient once accommodation status is established. Franklin Nat'l Bank
v. Eurez Constr. Corp., 301 N.Y.S.2d 845, 848 (Sup. Ct. 1969) (against taker for value
before note due);. Abby Fin. Corp. v. Weydig Auto Supplies, Inc., 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
858, 859 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967) (by indorser); Shulman v. Steve Lynn, Inc., 2 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 1046, 1047 (N.Y. Sup. Ct 1965,).
40. Darden v. Harrison, 511 S.W.2d 925, 927, 928 (Tex. 1974).
41. Brinker v. First Nat'l Bank, 37.S.W.2d 136 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1931, jdgmt
adopted). Also cited in support of the proposition that negotiation is not essential to
finding accommodation status were Lepori v. Hilson, 293 P. 86, 88 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1930), and First Nat'l Bank v. Reed, 244 P. 368, 370 (Cal. 1926), which are factually
similar to Whitesboro.
42.. Darden v. Harrison, 511 S.W.2d 925, 928.(Tex. 1974).
43. Id. at.928.
44. Id. at 927.
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the dissent in Darden vigorously points out, "[a]n accommodation party must
be a surety. Darden was never a surety and there was no intent that he
'45
become such."
.The official comments to the UCC clarify -the drafters' positon on the
interrelationship of suretyship and accommodation parties:
[A]n accommodation party is always a surety . . . and it is his only
distinguishing feature. He differs from other sureties only in that his
liability
is on the instrument and he is a surety for another party
4
to it. 6

7
While -no state has legislatively adopted the official comments to the UCC,4
they are frequently utilized in interpretations of the Code.48 Although some
courts have declined to follow the comments, 49 cases so holding are the exception. 50 There is no mention of the term surety in the provisions of the Code,
nor is there language making suretyship a prerequisite for accommodation
status. 5 ' There can be no doubt, however, that such was the intent of the
drafters, 52 and cases involving such relationships have been consistently
decided on the judicial assumption that an accommodation party is also
53
always a surety.
The position of the Supreme Court of Texas on this point is further
obscured 'by 'the use of -term "surety" in the Darden opinion where it is
clear .that reference is being made to an accommodation party..5 4 On the
issue of consideration the court adopted -the position of the official comments

45. Id. at 928.
46. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 3.415, Comment 1 (1968).
47. J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4, at 11 (1972).
48. E.g., United States v, First Nat'l Bank, 470 F.2d 944, 947 (8th Cir. 1973); In
re Varney Wood Prods., Inc., 458 F.2d 435, 437 (4th Cir. 1972); Thompson v. United
States, 408 F.2d 1075, 1084 (8th Cir. 1969); In re Yale Express Sys. Inc., 370 F.2d
433, 437 (2d Cir. 1966); Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Chemical Bank New York Trust
Co., 309 N.Y.S.2d 266, 267 (Civ. Ct. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 318 N.Y.S.2d 957
(Sup. Ct. 1970).
49. Wright v. Bank of Cal., N.A., 81 Cal. Rptr. 11, 14 (Ct. App. 1969) ("the plain
language of the statute cannot be varied by reference to the comments"); Zinni v. One
Township Line Corp., 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 305, 307 (Pa. 1965) (the comments are "not
controlling").
50. J. WHrTE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4, at 12 (1968).

51.

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

§ 3-415., The only place the word surety is used

in the text of the UCC is in section 1-201(40).
52. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-415, Comments 1,.2, 4.
53. E.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Hargrove, 503 S.W.2d 856, 859 (Tex, Civ. App.-Texarkana 1973, no writ); First. State Bank v. Hare, 152 S.W, 501, 502 (Tex. Civ. App.Austin,1912, no writ); accord, Rose v. Homsey, 197 N.E.2d 603, 606 (Mass. 1964);
Putney Credit Union v. King, 286 A.2d 282, 284 (Vt. 1971).
54. For example, "the party claimed to be accommodated [must have] received the
signature of the surety for the sole purpose of obtaining credit thereby . . . Darden
v. Harrison, 511 S.W.2d 925, 928 (Tex. 1974) (emphasis added).
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that receipt of no consideration by the accommodation party is immaterial,
but the repeated statements in the comments that the accommodation party
is always a surety were ignored.
It can be inferred from the language of the opinion that the payee may
now be a party accommodated by the maker of an instrument if the intent
of the maker was to lend his name to the payee by his signature. It appears
to be enough that the maker is a potential surety for the party accommodated, and will become a surety in fact only when the payee makes use of
the instrument, by negotiation or some other means, in order to obtain
credit. 55
Since the court in Darden has decided, without expressly stating, that an
accommodation party need not always be a surety, the case appears to be
unique in that respect. While decisions under the UCC have tacitly assumed
that an accommodation party is a surety, 56 only one such case has
approximately involved the question. In Gibbs Oil Co. v. Collentro &
Collentro, Inc., 7 the plaintiff unsuccessfully attempted to circumvent the rule
that the accommodation party is not liable to the party accommodated.5
It
was argued that the defendant indorser who had signed as an accommodation
for the payee was a surety, and could then assume liability as a surety to
the payee when the maker failed to pay on the note. 59 While not deciding
whether an accommodation party is always a surety, the court did say that
the payee's contention was a misinterpretation of the intent of the drafters
of the Code. 60
The same result could have been reached by other means in Darden v.
Harrison.6 1 First, the defendant's claim to accommodation status could have
been dismissed on the grounds that Darden never was a surety, and could
not therefore have been an accommodation party. This would not have been
unreasonable, especially since the court did utilize the comments on the issue
of consideration in Darden.6 2 It could then have been found that Darden's
promise, as contained in the notes, was dependent upon Tirey's promise to
55. The test in Darden is the "sole purpose of obtaining credit thereby," and not
that the credit must be obtained.

Id. at 928.

56. Rose v. Homsey, 197 N.E.2d 603, 606 (Mass. 1964); First Nat'l Bank v. Hargrove, 503 S.W.2d 856, 859 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1973, no writ); Putney Credit
Union v. King, 286 A.2d 282, 284 (Vt. 1971).
57. 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 361 (Mass. App. Div. 1968).
58. This provision is stated in Section 3-415(5) of the Code.
59. Gibbs Oil Co. v. Collentro & Collentro, Inc., 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 361, 362-63
(Mass. App. Div. 1968).

60. The court implied that the official comments were not meant to negate the provision in the statute that the accommodation party is not liable to the party accommodated. Id. at 363.
61. 511 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. 1974).
62. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE § 3.415, Comments 1, 2, 4 (1968); see Darden v.
Harrison, 511 S.W.2d 925, 927 (Tex. 1974).
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use the proceeds of the contemplated loan to settle with Darden. 63 Since
Tirey failed to procure the loan, there was a failure of consideration for Darden's promise. 64 Thus, the most favorable status that plaintiff could have
occupied would have been that of -a holder. 65 Since the claims of a holder
are subject -to the defense of want of consideration,6 6 Darden would not have
been liable in that situation.
Whether the Texas Supreme Court has abolished the suretyship requirement in the UCC will largely depend on how Darden is interpreted. 67 At
the least, Darden creates an exception in those cases where the payee is the
party accommodated. To the extent that the circumstances under which a
payee may be a party accommodated are broadened, it is a positive step.
On the other hand, the question raised by Darden concerning the status of
the suretyship requirement is an important one. Since intent is an elusive
element, the potential for fraud against either the payee or the maker will
be enhanced if the suretyship requirement has actually been abandoned.
Holmes Thomas Bennett
63. Price v. Appalachian Resources Co., 496 S.W.2d 137, 138 (Tex. Civ. App.Tyler 1973, no writ).
64. Town & Country Shoes Fed. Credit Union v. Cramer, 350 S.W.2d 281, 284
(Mo. Ct. App. 1961) indicates that as long as no other party has become involved, the
accommodation maker may set up want of consideration as a defense to an action by
the accommodated party, since there is no consideration as between them.
65. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 3.606 (1968). Neither the plaintiff nor
plaintiff's decedent gave value for the notes.
66. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 3.408 (1968).
67. If the suretyship requirement is disallowed by the supreme court, it would seem
that the purpose of the UCC, uniformity, would be defeated.
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